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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j) (1953, as amended) in that this appeal
concerns review of a final Order and Judgment of the Third
District Court, and the Utah Court of Appeals does not have
original jurisdiction over said Order and Judgment.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it
struck Appellant's pleadings, entered Appellant's default, and
entered Judgment upon that default, due to Appellant's Chairman's
failure to present himself for deposition and failure to make
discovery.
The applicable standard of review is whether or not
the trial court's exercise of discretion with relation to the
imposition of sanctions pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 37(d) is
arbitrary, capricious, or a clear abuse of discretion.

See

Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 239 (Utah 1970).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads
as follows:
If a party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a party or a person
designated under Rule 30(b) or 31(a) to
testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to
appear before the officer who is to take
his deposition, after being served with a
proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or
objections to interrogatories submitted
under Rule 33, after proper service of the
interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written
response to a request for inspection
submitted under Rule 34, after proper
1

service of the request, the court in which
the action is pending on motion may make
such orders in regard to the failure as are
just, and among others it may take any
action authorized under Paragraphs (A),
(B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this
rule. In lieu of any order or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the party
failing to act or the attorney advising him
or both to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure, unless the court finds that the
failure was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this
subdivision may not be excused on the
ground that the discovery sought is
objectionable unless the party failing to
act has applied for a protective order as
provided by Rule 26(c).
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(d).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the Order Granting Sanctions
and Default Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, J. Stirba presiding, against Appellant.
The underlying case is a suit for the collection of
attorneys fees which Appellee claims are owed, and unpaid, for
services rendered.

Appellant claims that the fees, as billed and

claimed, are excessive, and beyond the scope of the oral
agreement between the parties, and indeed, beyond the scope of
reasonableness.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

This action began as a suit for the collection of
attorneys fees billed by Appellee (hereinafter referred to as

2

"Watkiss"), for services rendered on behalf of Appellant
(hereinafter referred to as "Foa").
In 1986, Foa was sued in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, in a case styled Daw,
Incorporated v. American Home Assurance Co., et al., Civil No.
86C0330W.

Watkiss was retained to represent Foa in that action,

and obtained a favorable result.
In 1987. Watkiss billed Foa for the legal services
rendered.

Foa refused to pay the bill as submitted by Watkiss,

because Foa objected to the inclusion of a $10,000.00
"exceptional result" fee, as well as an hourly charge for one of
the attorneys involved of $110.00 per hour.

Foa claimed that the

agreed rate was $105.00 per hour.
Watkiss filed this action for collection of the
attorneys fees, as billed, on August 26, 1987.

Foa filed a

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, which was
denied on September 12, 1988.
Watkiss filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, based
upon Affidavits filed supporting its claim that the attorneys
fees, as billed, were reasonable and necessary.

Foa defended,

using the affidavit of its then attorney of record, Lynn Charles
Spafford, to oppose the affidavits regarding the reasonableness
and necessity of the attorneys fees as billed by Watkiss.
Watkiss' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on November 1,
1988.
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On March 22, 1991, the November 1988 Summary Judgment
was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court, and remanded for trial on
the issues of fact raised by the Affidavit of Lynn Charles
Spafford.
After noticing the deposition of Foa?s chairman,
Conrad Foa, and after Mr. Foa failed to appear for the scheduled
deposition, Watkiss moved the trial court for an order striking
Foafs pleadings and an entry of default judgment.
On December 2, 1991, the trial court ordered Conrad
Foa to appear for deposition on or before December 20, 1991 at
12:00 noon, and to pay $500.00 in attorneys fees.
Conrad Foa's deposition was rescheduled for December
17, 1991. Mr. Foa failed to appear for this deposition.

This

caused Appellant Foa to file a motion to change Conrad Foa's
deposition to New York City.
Because of Conrad Foa's failure to appear for the
December 17, 1991 deposition, and citing Conrad Foa's failure to
abide by the trial court's December 2, 1991 order, on January 14,
1992, the trial court granted Watkiss' second motion for
sanctions, and directed plaintiff's counsel to prepare an order
and default judgment.
After Foa's counsel withdrew from this matter, and
after being persuaded to reappear, Foa, through its counsel,
moved the trial court to vacate its order granting sanctions. At
the time of said motion, no default judgment had been submitted,
nor entered.
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On February 18, 1992, the trial court, via minute
entry, denied Foa's Rule 59(e) Motion.
On February 21, 1992, the trial court signed and
entered its Order of Sanctions and Default Judgment.

Foa filed

its Notice of Appeal on March 19, 1992.
C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL

There was no trial of this case, as it was disposed of
via Default Judgment in favor of Appellee.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
All page citations are to the Utah R. App. P. 11(b)
pagination of the original record in this matter.
1.

Foa retained the services of Watkiss to represent

it in the case of Daw, Inc., Plaintiff v. American Home Assurance
Co.; National Union Fir Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA.;
Plastro Tech Industries, Inc.; Foa & Son Corporation; and Does 1
through 50; Defendants.

(Civil No. 86 C 0330 W), pending before

the United States District Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division.
2.

(Complaint, p. 3 ) .

Watkiss represented FoaTs interest in the action,

and obtained a favorable result.
3.

(Amended Complaint, p. 14).

Watkiss' claim for damages against Foa includes a

$10,000.00 exceptional result fee, and an hourly charge of
$110.00 per hour.

(Supreme Court Op. [March 22, 1991], p. 201)

(See also Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 [1991]).
4.

Watkiss filed this action on August 26, 1987.

(Complaint, p. 2).
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5.

Watkiss obtained denial of Foa's Motion to Dismiss

for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction on September 12, 1988. (Order,
[dated 9-12-88], p. 58).
6.

Watkiss obtained summary judgment against Foa on

November 1, 1988.
7.

(Judgment [dtd. 11-1-88], pp. 111-112).

On March 22, 1991, the November 1, 1988 Summary

Judgment of the trial Court was reversed by this Court, and
remanded for trial on the issues of fact raised by an affidavit
filed by Lynn Charles Spafford.
8.

(Remittitur, p. 200).

Watkiss attempted, in October, 1991, to obtain the

deposition of Conrad Foa, Foa's Chairman.

Appellant Foa did not

know that Mr. Foa would not appear for his deposition, and
accordingly, failed to notify its counsel or Watkiss of the nonappearance of Mr. Foa.

Mr. Foa, however, failed to appear for

his deposition on the scheduled date.

Watkiss was then notified

by Foa's counsel that Mr. Foa would not be appearing for his
deposition.

(Notice of Deposition, p. 254, Mot. for Sanctions,

p. 262).
9.

Watkiss then moved for an order striking Appellant

Foa's pleadings and entering default judgment.

(Mot. for

Sanctions, pp. 259-78).
10.

By Order dated December 2, 1991, the trial court

ordered Conrad Foa to present himself in Salt Lake City for
deposition on or before December 20, 1991 at 12:00 noon, and to
pay $500.00 in attorney's fees by reason of his failure to appear
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for deposition as scheduled.

(Minute Entry [dtd. 12-2-91], p.

291).
11.

Watkiss rescheduled Mr. Foa's deposition for

December 17, 1991.
12.

(Notice of Deposition, p. 292).

Mr. Foa refused to appear for deposition, which

refusal caused Appellant Foa to file a motion to change the
deposition to New York.

(Second Mot. for Sanctions, p. 306; Mot.

to Change Place of Deposition, p. 296).
13.

Watkiss filed a second motion for sanctions,

citing Conrad Foa's refusals to present himself for deposition as
ordered by the court.
14.

(Second Mot. for Sanctions, p. 304).

By minute entry dated January 14, 1992, the Court

granted Watkiss' second motion for sanctions, and directed
Watkiss' counsel to prepare an order and default judgment.
(Minute Entry [dtd. 1-14-92], p. 352).
15.

Three days after the Court's ruling, counsel for

Foa withdrew from the case, thereby staying further proceedings
for 20 days under Rule 4-506(c), Code of Judicial Administration.
(Withdrawal of Counsel, p. 354).
16.

On February 4, 1992, Foa's former counsel

reappeared in the case, and moved the Court to vacate its order
granting sanctions.

(Re-appearance of Counsel, p. 363; Mot. to

Alter or Amend Order . . ., p. 358).
17.

Watkiss prepared a form of order striking

defendant's pleadings and entering default judgment, which was
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served on Foa's counsel on February 7, 1991.

(Mem. in Opp. Mot.

to Alter or Amend Order . . . , at Exhibit 2, pp. 377-378).
18.

On February 18, 1992, the trial court, via minute

entry, denied Foa's Rule 59(e) Motion.

(Minute Entry [dtd. 2-18-

92], p. 385).
19.

On February 21, 1992, the trial court signed and

entered its Order of Sanctions and Default Judgment.

(Order

Granting Sanctions, p. 393). (Order Granting Sanctions, p. 393).
20.

The Judgment entered against Foa in this matter

included damages awarded to Watkiss as follows:
a.

$40,583.07, representing the principal amount

of Watkiss' claim;
b.

$19,106.30, representing interest accrued

through February 10, 1992;
c.

$304.20, representing Watkiss' costs;

d.

$16,000.00, representing Watkiss' attorney's

fees. (Order Granting Sanctions, pp. 393-394).
21.

No evidentiary hearing was held by the trial

court before entering judgment for damages prayed in the Amended
Complaint.
22.
1992.

Foa filed its Notice of Appeal on March 19,

(Notice of Appeal, p. 398).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A party's pleadings should not be stricken and default

judgment should not be granted against that party, solely for
disobeying an order to cooperate in discovery procedures, unless
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this stringent measure is employed with caution and restraint. A
party's repeated failure to appear for deposition is sufficient
grounds for a trial court to enter default judgment as a
sanction.

However, in this case, Appellant Foa is being

penalized for the failure of a fact witness, albeit the chairman
of the board of Appellant, to appear and be deposed after proper
notice.

Entering Appellant's default, and judgment thereon,

based upon a fact witness' failure to be deposed, was an abuse of
discretion.
The trial court should have held an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether or not Watkiss was entitled to the
damages claimed, and whether or not the damages claimed were
reasonable.

Furthermore, the trial court's entry of default

judgment on Watkiss' claim for attorneys fees was an abuse of
discretion, in that no hearing was held, nor were specific facts
found to support the attorneys fees judgment.
Finally, the trial court's entry of judgment on
Watkiss' claim for the $10,000.00 exceptional result fee is an
abuse of discretion, and is an unwarranted condonation of
excessive and unreasonable attorneys fees.
Regardless of the type of judgment imposed, a judgment
should only be entered for amount to which a party is legally
entitled.

The trial court failed to find either entitlement,

basis or reasonableness for the $10,000.00 exceptional result fee
and the collection litigation attorneys fees..

9

This failure is

an abuse of discretion, and warrants a reversal or remitter of
the judgment amount,
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN STRIKING APPELLANT'S PLEADINGS

This Court has held that the striking of a party's
pleadings and granting of judgment to the opposing party solely
for disobeying an order to cooperate in discovery procedures is a
stringent measure, which should only be employed with caution and
restraint.

Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 97, 396

P.2d 410 (1964).
Other appellate courts, when faced with similar
issues, have held that granting default judgment should only be
utilized as a last resort when other lesser sanctions are clearly
insufficient to accomplish the desired end.

See Burkhart by

Meeks v. Philsco Products Co., Inc., 241 Kan. 562, 738 P.2d 433
(1987).

The Washington Court of Appeals held that the entry of

default judgment and striking of pleadings must only be used as a
sanction for discovery non-compliance when it is apparent from
the record that the court explicitly considered whether a lesser
sanction would probably have cured the improper behavior, and
whether a refusal to obey a discovery order substantially
prejudiced the opponent's ability to prepare for trial.

See

Snedigar v. Hodderson, 53 Wash. App. 476, 968 P.2d 1 (1989).
[emphasis added].
In Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (Utah
1976), this Court held that a partyf s repeated failure to appear
10

for deposition was sufficient grounds for the trial court to
enter sanctions, including default judgment, against the noncomplying party.

Conrad Foa, the recalcitrant deponent

herein, is not the defendant in this matter, but is only the
defendant's chairman.

While he was given notice of deposition,

and was eventually ordered by the Court to appear and be deposed,
he is still not the party in interest.
Mr. Foa was a fact witness in Foa's defense against
Watkiss' excessive claims for attorney's fees.

The sanctions

imposed upon Foa by the trial court were imposed because of a
fact witness' failure to appear for deposition.

Foa asserts that

rather than strike its pleadings and enter default judgment due
to one of Foa's fact witness' failure to obey discovery orders,
the trial court should have ruled that Conrad Foa's failure to
appear a second time would result in Foa being prohibited from
using Conrad Foa as a witness in this action.
Such a result would have been more in line with the
rulings of appellate courts regarding the severity of sanctions
and use of default judgment, and would have been a lesser
sanction which would have still prevented Foa from profiting from
its witness' failure to obey discovery orders.

Such a result

would have not prejudiced Watkiss, in that Watkiss would have
then be freed from preparing to combat testimony of the noncomplying witness, and would have allowed Watkiss to disregard
any proposed testimony of the non-complying witness.

Finally,

such a result would be substantially just and equitable, and
11

would have allowed Foa to proceed with its defense of this
action, rather than suffer the severe sanction of being unable to
proceed with its defense, and suffer default judgment, due to a
fact witness1 failure to appear for deposition.
Foa is a New York corporation, and as such is entitled
to the respect and protections of having been duly incorporated,
Conrad Foa, notwithstanding sharing the name of Appellant Foa, is
not the appellant, and was not the defendant in this action.
Appellant Foa is entitled to be treated as a separate entity from
Conrad Foa, and should not suffer the sanction of default
judgment due to the failure of an employee and fact witness to
obey the discovery orders of the trial court.
could have been remedied, and was not.

A lesser sanction

The entry of default

judgment for failure of Foa's fact witness to obey the trial
court's discovery order was too severe a remedy, visits extreme
prejudice upon Foa, was an abuse of discretion, and should be
reversed by this Court.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN ITS ENTRY OF SANCTIONS
A.

Entry of damages without an evidentiary
hearing was an abuse of discretion.

Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court was within
its discretion to strike Foa's pleadings, the trial court
nevertheless abused its discretion when it entered default
judgment against Foa without the benefit of an evidentiary
hearing.
The Court of Appeals has ruled that:
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As a general rule, a 'default
judgment establishes] as a
matter of law, that defendants
[are] liable to plaintiff as to
each cause of action alleged in
the complaint' . . .
Nevertheless, it is still
incumbent upon the non-defaulting
party to establish by competent
evidence the amount of
recoverable damages and costs he
claims.
Arnica Mut, Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965 (Utah App.
1989), quoting Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete
Prods., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983) [emphasis added].
See also

Kwik Way Stores Inc. v. Caldwell, 709 P.2d 30, 38

(Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Armijo v. Armijo, 98 N.M. 518, 650 P.2d
40, 42 (Ct. App. 1982).
Accordingly, assuming Watkiss was entitled to an award
of sanctions, Foa was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the
sanctions if those sanctions were to be default judgment on
Watkiss' complaint.

Watkiss' claims included a $10,000.00

exceptional result fee, and an hourly charge for attorney time of
$110.00 per hour.

There is no dispute that there was no contract

entered into between the parties.

Before judgment could have

been entered upon Watkiss' Complaint, the Court was required to
hold an evidentiary hearing, to take evidence, and to judicially
determine Watkiss' entitlement to its claimed damages, and the
proper amounts to be awarded.

The trial court's default judgment

must be reversed, because Watkiss' claims were not for sums
certain, Watkiss' claims included items which were clearly
13

excessive and not contemplated by the parties at the time of
Watkiss1 beginning its services for Foa, and there was no hearing
in the trial court to ascertain the amount of damages to which
Watkiss is due.

See Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah

1984).
B.

Entry of default judgment damages of
attorney's fees was an abuse of discretion

Utah follows the well-established rule that attorney's
fees cannot be recovered unless provided for by contract or
statute.

See Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061,

1067, (Utah 1991).

See e.g. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781

P.2d 414, 419-20 (Utah 1989); Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis
Management, 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982).
In this case, it is agreed that no written retainer
agreement was signed and therefore, no contractual claim for
attorney's fees may be sought.

See Watkiss & Campbell, supra, at

1067.
This leaves any entitlement to attorney's fees by
Watkiss dependant upon statute.

A statutory award of attorney's

fees is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953, as amended),
which provides:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall
award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines
that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith, except under
Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may
award no fees or limited fees against a
14

party under Subsection (1), but only if the
court:
(a) finds the party has
filed an affidavit of
impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the
record the reason for not
awarding fees under the
provisions of Subsection (1).
Utah Code Ann,, supra, § 78-27-56.

See also Watkiss & Campbell,

supra at 1067-68.
Watkiss cannot base its claim for attorney's fees upon
the statute, in that the statute clearly states that "the court
shall award attorney fees to the prevailing party only if it
determines (1) that the action is without merit and (2) that
the action was brought in bad faith."

Watkiss & Campbell, supra,

at 1068. [emphasis added].

See e.g. Cody v. Johnson, 671 P.2d

149, 151-152 (Utah 1983),

Unless the Court finds both elements

of the statute, it cannot award attorneys fees.
In the Arnica case, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals
stated that in awarding attorneys fees under § 78-27-50, supra,
"the trial court must make findings that (1) the claim or claims
were without merit, and (2) the party's conduct was lacking in
good faith."

Arnica, supra, at 966 [emphasis added].

Without

specific findings, this Court has ruled that a "reviewing court
cannot determine whether the award of attorney's fees was based
upon a meritless claim brought in bad faith or simply because the
recovering party prevailed."

Watkiss & Campbell, supra at 1068.
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In the instant action, the trial court failed to enter
any findings regarding meritless defenses or bad faith.

This

absolute absence of findings, coupled with the lack of any
contract whatsoever, renders the trial court's entry of default
judgment damages of attorneys fees against Foa an abuse of
discretion.

This Court should vacate the trial court's award of

attorney's fees.

See e.g. Arnica, supra at 966.
C.

Entry of default damages upon
Appellee's claim for a $10,000.00 exceptional
result fee and for principal damages arising
from $110.00 per hour charges was an abuse of
discretion.

This Court has ruled that a judgment against a
defaulting party must be reversed where plaintiff's claims for
damages were not for sums certain, and a hearing was not
conducted by the trial court to ascertain the amount of damages
to which the plaintiffs were entitled.
P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984).

Russell v. Martell, 681

As noted above, the trial court failed to

hold a hearing regarding damages after entry of default in this
matter.

Additionally, the trial court failed to enter any

findings supporting its award of default damages.
A judgment rendered under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure must contain only a judgment to which a party is
entitled as a matter of law.
934 (Utah 1979).

See e.g. Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d

By analogy, Foa asserts, a judgment rendered

under Rules 37 and 55 must also contain only those damages to
which a party is entitled as a matter of law.

It would be

manifestly unjust and unwise to allow trial courts to enter
16

default judgments for damages to which the non-defaulting party
is not entitled as a matter of law.

Such a practice would

destroy the validity and legitimacy of court proceedings and
court orders upon which our judicial system is based.
In this case, no contract or retainer agreement was
entered by the parties.

Watkiss rendered legal services, and

upon the conclusion of those services, presented Foa with a bill
for $40,583.07.

Included in the bill was a charge of $10,000.00

for "exceptional result," and charges for attorney time at
$110.00 per hour.

Watkiss1 was given to understand that attorney

time would be charged at $105.00 per hour.

See Watkiss &

Campbell, supra, at 1062.
Rule 1.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an
agreement for, charge or collect an illegal
or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearly
excessive when, after a review of the
facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would
be left with a definite and firm conviction
that the fee is in excess of a reasonable
fee. Factors to be considered as guides in
determining the reasonableness of a fee
include the following:
(1) The time and labor required,
the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill
required to perform the legal
service properly;
(2) The likelihood, if apparent
to the client, that the
acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other
employment by the lawyer;
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(3) The fee customarily charged
in the locality for similar legal
services;
(4) The amount involved and the
results obtained;
(5) The time limitations imposed
by the client or by the
circumstances;
(6) The nature and length of the
professional relationship with
the client;
(7) The experience, reputation
and ability of the lawyer or
lawyers performing the services;
and
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or
contingent.
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly
represented the client, the basis or rate
of the fee shall be communicated to the
client, preferably in writing, before or
within a reasonable time after commencing
the representation.
Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.5(a), (b). [emphasis added].
No hearing was held to determine the reasonableness or
excessiveness of Watkiss' fees upon the entry of Foa's default.
There was no contract between the parties.

In the absence of a

written contract between the parties, Watkiss1 claims for
services must sound as a claim for quantum meruit, rather than
breach of contract.

See e.g. Parents Against Drunk Drivers v.

Graystone Pines Homeowners' Ass'n., 789 P.2d 52 (Utah 1990).
Damages under a quantum meruit theory are not sums certain, and
therefore an evidentiary hearing should have been held.

The

Court of Appeals also held that in order to determine the amount
an attorney is entitled to under a theory of quantum meruit, the
18

Court should look initially to the amount which the parties
reasonably intended the attorney to be compensated.
supra, at 57.

See Parents,

"If the amount the parties reasonably intended

[the attorney] to recover is not discernable, the Court should
award [the attorney] the reasonable value of his services."

Id.

at 58.
In this case, there was no hearing, and consequently
it was impossible for the trial court to determine either the
amount the parties intended as compensation, or a reasonable
amount.

An evidentiary hearing should have been held to

determine the reasonable value of Watkiss1 services.

Foa asserts

that whatever these reasonable fees would have been found to
include, they most definitely would not have included a
$10,000.00 "exceptional result" fee.

Lawyers are engaged to

represent their clients, and to zealously advocate those clients'
positions.

If indeed the result achieved by Watkiss was

extraordinary, it was still no less than what was achieved by
doing its job.

Awarding Watkiss a $10,000.00 "exceptional

result" fee implies that simply paying an attorney his or her
hourly rate will not ensure the attorney's most devoted efforts,
and that extra compensation must be provided to guarantee the
attorney's "extraordinary" efforts.

Such a practice cannot be

condoned, nor should it be implied.

This inference is surely not

what Watkiss intended when it claimed its exceptional result fee,
however, this inference is certainly what will abide this case
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should the $10,000.00 "exceptional result" fee be allowed to
stand as part of the judgment.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred when it struck Appellant Foa's
pleadings, and entered default judgment upon Watkiss1 Amended
Complaint, solely because Conrad Foa failed to appear for
deposition and disregarded an order o£ the Court.

The trial

court erred when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing as to
the entitlement of Watkiss to the amounts claimed in its Amended
Complaint.

The trial court erred when it upheld and awarded

Watkiss1 claims for a $10,000.00 "exceptional result" fee, an
unagreed $110.00 per hour fee and attorneys fees in prosecuting
this collection action.
By reason of these errors, Foa prays this Court to
reverse the default judgment of the trial court and either remand
for an entry of lesser sanctions, or remand for an evidentiary
hearing as to Watkiss' entitlement to, and the legality and
reasonableness of, the damages claimed by Watkiss in its Amended
Complaint.
DATED this

1^

day of July, 1992.
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
A Professional Corporation

ASpafford
A. i W
Clark A. Harms
Attorneys for Appellant
lcs\foa\opening.brl
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ADDENDUM
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. ,i.cU i« CLEHK'Ss urriut
Salt Lake County Utah

FEB 2 1 1992

S^,

Om Court

WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN
VINCENT C. RAMPTON (2684)
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WATKISS & CAMPBELL, a
professional corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FOA & SON, a New York
corporation,

RiT«iyot

2-SH-clQ-<&\Wxx-~v
ORDER GRANTING SANCTIONS
FOR FAILURE TO MAKE
DISCOVERY
Civil No, C87-05684
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendant.

Plaintiff's Second Motion for Sanctions for Failure tc
Make Discovery having been submitted to the Court in accordance
with Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration; the Court
having reviewed the submittals of the parties and the record in
this matter; and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

That plaintiff's Second Motion for Sanctions for

Failure to Make Discovery be and hereby is granted;
2. That defendant's Answer be and hereby is stricken and

its default entered herein;
3. That judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of
plaintiff Watkiss & Campbell, and against defendant Foa & Son in
the following amounts:
a.

$40,583.07, representing the principal amount

of plaintiff's claim;
b.

$19,106.30,

representing

interest

accrued

through February 10, 1992;
c.

$304.2, representing plaintiff's costs herein;

d. $16,000, representing

plaintiff's

attorney's

fees; and
e. Interest on the foregoing at the legal rate from
and after February 10, 1992 until paid in full; and
4.

That this judgment shall be augmented in the amount

of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting
said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established
by affidavit.
DATED this P-( S^

day of February, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify -that I am a member of and/or employ
by the firm of Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main Street, Sui
1200, Salt Lake City, Utah and that in said capacity and pursuaa
to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a copy of the foregoii
form of Order Granting Sanctions for Failure to Make Discovery wa
caused to be served upon:
Earl S. Spafford, Esq.
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
by hand delivery this

^
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the ^Q^&ky

of July, 1992, I mailed a

true and correct copy of the foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF THE
APPELLANT, postage prepaid and addressed to the following:
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Appellee

